Propositions, situations, and certain other entities, introduced into a discourse with a non-nominal expression, are typically available to immediate subsequent reference with a demonstrative pronoun, but not with a personal pronoun. The paper examines the effects of information structure and the lexical semantics of verbs taking clausal complements on these possibilities of subsequent reference. A one-way relationship is found between possibilities for subsequent reference and an information structural bifurcation into focus and ground (or comment and topic, rheme and theme). When an expression introducing one of the entities in question occurs in the informational focus, the contrast in subsequent reference by a demonstrative versus a personal pronoun mentioned above is obtained; when such an expression occurs in the informational ground, the contrast is neutralized. Furthermore, the contrast is obtained for an entity introduced by a (informationally focal) bridge verb complement, but not by a non-bridge verb complement. These effects are explained in terms of the referential possibilities conferred by different referring forms according to Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (1993) , and the role of information and lexical structure in bringing an entity into focus of attention.
Introduction
When certain entities are introduced into a discourse by a clause (or sequence of clauses), they are accessible to immediate subsequent reference with demonstrative pronouns, but comparatively inaccessible to reference with the personal pronoun it, as noted by Webber (1988 Webber ( , 1991 , among others.
For example, when the first sentence in (la) introduces the situation of there being a snake on the speaker's desk, the demonstrative pronoun that in the second sentence can refer to this situation; and with this second mention of the situation, the pronoun it in the third sentence can also refer to this situation. But in (Ib), the personal pronoun // cannot be felicitously used for immediate subsequent reference to the situation introduced by the first sentence; // is more naturally interpreted as referring to the snake itself.
(1)
a. There was a snake on my desk. That scared me. It scared my office-mate too. b. There was a snake on my desk. It scared me.
In (2), an act introduced into the discourse is subject to immediate subsequent reference using that, which can refer to the act of destroying the leaf collection, while it is more naturally interpreted as referring to the leaf collection itself, not to the act of destroying it.
(2)
A: Max destroyed his leaf collection last night. B: That was dumb. It was dumb.
In (3), the same referential behavior is exhibited by the fact, introduced in the opening quote, that Mr. Montanarelli and his associates believe Ms. Lewinsky, and the court does not.
(3) a. "We believe her, the court does not, and that resolves the matter," Mr. Montanarelli said today of Ms. Lewinsky's testimony that she had an independent recollection of the date. (New York Times, May 24, 2000) a'. "We believe her, the court does not, and it resolves the matter,"
Mr. Montanarelli said today of Ms. Lewinsky's testimony that she had an independent ...
The same can be observed for a proposition in (4), and a complex situation in (5). "The fact that you can get a sheep or a mouse that looks normal," said Stuart Newman, a developmental biologist at New York Medical College, "doesn't mean that some subtle things haven't gone wrong in brain development that you wouldn't necessarily notice in a sheep, but you would in a human .... Cloned humans might show higher rates of cancer or other diseases, but we'd only find out by cloning them and waiting to see if disaster strikes. None of this means, however, that cloning services won't someday be marketed to desperate people-or even that human cloning isn't going on right now. (Talbot, Margaret. February 4, 2001 . New York Times Magazine, Section 6, p. 45.) # None of it means, however, ...
In (6) , that refers to the proposition or statement that the poodle is one of the most intelligent dogs around. The pronoun it would have been infelicitous here.
(6)
A: I read somewhere that the poodle is one of the most intelligent dogs around. B: well uhm..I definitely wouldn't dispute that. (Switchboard Corpus, Dialog 2019) B': ?? well uhm..I definitely wouldn't dispute it. This paper will examine the role of various factors in affecting the salience, and hence the accessibility to pronominal reference, of entities introduced into a discourse by a full clause. We begin with the premise that the possibility of pronominal reference with // versus that depends on the cognitive status of the referent, in the sense of Gundel, Hedberg & Zacharski (1993) . This formulation of the problem provides grounds for an explanation of the data presented above, and provides a framework within which we examine the role of various other factors in promoting the salience of a clausally introduced entity, including the information structure of the utterance in which the entity is introduced. For entities introduced by clausal In (6B), stress can fall on the demonstrative pronoun, or elsewhere in the utterance. In (6B'), in contrast, the personal pronoun // cannot bear stress. The point here is that (6B') is infelicitous with any stress pattern.
complements to bridge verbs, we show that the information structure of the utterance introducing the entity has a partial, or one-sided, effect on the salience of the entity. When the complement clause is focal, the salience of the entity depends only on its referential givenness-newness (in the sense of Gundel 1988 Gundel , 1999b ), as we would expect. But when the complement clause is ground material, the salience of an entity introduced by the clause is enhanced. Other factors, including the presuppositionality of factive and interrogative complements, also serve to enhance the salience of entities introduced by complement clauses.
2.
The Givenness Hierarchy
The contrasts noted in the previous section can be insightfully formulated in terms of proposals made by Gundel, Hedberg & Zacharski (1993, and earlier work) regarding the relationship between referring forms and speaker assumptions about the cognitive status (memory and attention state) of a referent on the part of the addressee.
Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski propose that determiners and pronouns constrain possible interpretations of nominal forms by conventionally signaling the cognitive status that the intended referent is assumed to have in the mind of the addressee. This helps solve a general problem posed by the fact that the descriptive content encoded in the form of a referring expression typically underdetermines the intended referent of the expression on a particular occasion of use. For example, in (7), the content words of the phrase these primitive reptiles do not uniquely determine which primitive reptiles are being referred to, but the determiner these serves to restrict possible referents to ones that are currently activated (that is, in working memory) for the addressee. Science, v.261, 1993 Science, v.261, , 1649 The statuses are in a unidirectional entailment relation. If something is in focus, it is necessarily activated; if it is activated, it is necessarily familiar; and so on. The theory thus correctly predicts that a given cognitive status can be appropriately coded by a form which explicitly signals that status, As a practical matter for the linguistic theorist seeking to discover the form-status correlations for a language, it is essential to determine the cognitive status of an entity on a particular occasion of reference independently of the linguistic form used by the speaker or writer on that occasion. This can be done by examining prior mention of the entity in the discourse, the environmental salience of the entity on the occasion of reference, the descriptive content of the nominal form used on the occasion of reference, and other clues to the cognitive status assumed for the entity by the speaker (or writer) on the part of the addressee. but also, in general, by forms whose meanings are entailed by that status. In (9), for example, the phrase these systems explicitly signals that the referent is activated, since this is part of the meaning of the proximal demonstrative j determiner thisfthese in English. : The determiner these in these systems is appropriate since the intended referent was just introduced in the preceding sentence and therefore could be expected to be activated for the addressee. But since anything activated is also familiar, uniquely identifiable, referential, and type identifiable, other forms would have been appropriate here as well, including those systems, which requires familiarity, the systems, which requires the ability to associate a unique representation, or ultradense memory storage systems, which requires only the ability to identify the type.
4
An intended referent is uniquely identifiable if the addressee can assign a unique representation to it, where the individuating property is distinct from what is predicated of the referent in the rest of the sentence. This should not be confused with the Russellian notion of uniqueness as a property of the referent or the concept of identifiability as the ability to recognize a particular referent independently of the description itself. Within the Givenness Hierarchy framework, uniqueness and identifiability are not properties of the actual referent in the world or in the universe of discourse. Rather, they are properties of the addressee's representation of the referent. A representation is unique just in case it contains sufficient information to distinguish it from other representations in memory. This sense of uniquely identifiable is thus also neutral between the referential and attributive uses discussed in Donnellan (1966) . Similarly, the cognitive status 'referential' applies just in case the speaker intends to refer to a particular entity (and intends the addressee to have a representation of that entity by the time he is finished processing the sentence), independently of whether he knows the exact identity of the referent. Consider, for example, the following sentence (brought to our attention by an anonymous reviewer of this paper).
(i) Whatever there was creeping around, it kept me awake.
The intended referent of it in (i) (whatever there was creeping around) can be assumed to be in focus for the addressee since it was just introduced in topic position in the same sentence. Since it is in focus, it is necessarily also activated, i.e. in working memory; and since it is in working memory, it must be familiar
The use of less restrictive forms has limits, however. The indefinite article is rarely used if the status is higher than referential, and typically implicates non-familiarity. Most in-focus referents are not coded with demonstratives, even though they could be; and demonstratives often implicate a focus shift. Such facts follow from interaction of the Givenness Hierarchy with general pragmatic principles involved in language production and understanding (see Grice 1975 , Sperber & Wilson 1986 . The implicational nature of the GH gives rise to 'scalar implicatures', in the sense of Horn (1972) , which further restrict the distribution and interpretation of referring forms (see Gundel et al. 1993 , Gundel & Mulkern 1998 .
With this background, Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski propose that the possibility of reference with personal pronouns versus demonstratives depends on the cognitive status of the referent. While both types of pronouns restrict possible referents to those that are activated (in working memory), personal pronouns also require the more restrictive status in focus, that is, their referents must be the current center of attention. This is illustrated in (10)-(11) below, from Gundel et al. (1993) . (10) In (10), an entity introduced prominently in the first sentence is rendered in focus, and then referred to by a personal pronoun in the second. In (11), an entity introduced more peripherally in the first sentence is made activated, but not in-focus, and can be referred to more felicitously by a demonstrative than a personal pronoun in the second. This permits an explanation of the facts in section 1 in terms of the Givenness Hierarchy. For example, in (2), at the conclusion of A's utterance, (i.e. in memory). If it is familiar, there must be a unique representation, the identifying property here being 'x was creeping around'. This is what the speaker intended to refer to, and it is therefore referential. Finally, since it is referential (the addressee has a representation of what the speaker intended to refer to), the addressee must be able to identify the type, in this case, things that creep around. The speaker could in fact have gone on to refer to this type, as in (ii).
(ii) Whatever there was creeping around, it kept me awake. Those things always do. the act of destroying the leaf collection can be assumed to be activated, since it was just introduced in the preceding sentence, but not in focus; the focus of attention after the utterance is processed is on the referents of the major arguments in (2A), specifically, John and the leaf collection. Similarly, in (5), the complex situation consisting of potential drawbacks to human cloning is rendered activated by the first paragraph, but we can assume that it is not rendered in focus given the higher salience conferred by this passage on cloned humans, rates of cancer, and other referents of main clause arguments. Accounts of other examples in section 1 proceed along similar lines.
In the following section, we examine factors that contribute to bringing an entity into focus, including the role that information structure plays in determining the cognitive statuses of referents introduced by clauses and thus the nominal forms which can be used to refer to these entities.
3.
What brings an entity into focus of attention?
Syntactic structure
The framework outlined above makes predictions about the appropriateness of different pronominal forms depending on whether or not the intended referent can be assumed to be in focus for the addressee. Although the theory itself does not predict what brings an entity into focus, Gundel et al. (1993: 279) suggest that "the entities in focus at a given point in the discourse will be that partially-ordered subset of activated entities which are likely to be continued as topics of subsequent utterances." Membership in this set is partly, though not wholly, determined by syntactic structure. For example, subjects and direct objects of matrix sentences are more likely to bring an entity into focus than elements in subordinate clauses and prepositional phrases. For similar reasons, the focus of attention at the end of an utterance is more likely to be on the thematic arguments of the verb of a clause within the utterance (including the main clause), than on the proposition, fact, or situation expressed by that clause (cf. the Centering Algorithms of Grosz, Joshi & Weinstein 1983 , 1995 .
A fact or proposition introduced by an NP within a clause is thus more likely to be brought into focus than one which is introduced by the whole clause. Compare (12) and (13) with the examples in (3) and (4) (12) are unordered sets, and that the elements of these sets are conceptualized as fully individuated, discrete objects, akin to concrete objects. Like concrete objects, they can be rendered immediately in focus upon their introduction into a discourse, depending, as in (10)- (11), on whether they are introduced in a sufficiently central syntactic position within the introducing sentence.
Less overt factors
Conditions which appear to boost the salience of entities also include less overt factors such as presuppositions and prior beliefs, and even inquisitive looks, all of which can cause an entity to be "reprocessed", and thus brought into focus, even when it is overtly mentioned only once (see Borthen et al. 1997 , Gundel et al. 1999 .
In (14), a baseline case for comparison, the speaker, upon clausally introducing the fact that linguists earn less than computer scientists, can assume that this fact is rendered activated, but not in-focus, for the hearer, leading to a preference for that over it in the follow-up reference to this fact.
See also Fraurud (1996) for a discussion of such effects.
(14) a. I hear linguists earn less than computer scientists, and that's terrible. b. ?? I hear linguists earn less than computer scientists, and it's terrible.
In (15), in contrast, the follow-up reference is made by another speaker, which results in somewhat more complicated inferences regarding the cognitive status of the fact at issue.
(15) Speaker A: I just read that linguists earn less than computer scientists. Speaker B: (i) That's terrible! (ii) It's terrible! At the completion of A's utterance, B can assume that the fact that linguists earn less than computer scientists is at least activated for A. In response B(i), B signals the assumption that this fact has been activated, but possibly not brought into focus by A's utterance, thereby inviting A to infer that the fact is news to B. In response B(ii), B signals the assumption that the fact is in focus for A, or ought to be, consistent with it being accepted background information for discourse in the relevant social circle; this invites A to infer that B already knew the fact.
In (16) below, the proposition that B has a dental appointment is clausally introduced by A's utterance. This, by itself, suffices to activate the proposition, but not to bring it into focus, accounting for why the response (16)B' sounds unnatural. But (16)B" is noticeably more acceptable than (16)B'. Following Gundel, Borthen and Fretheim (1999) , we suggest an explanation of this fact, drawing on a relevance-theoretic approach to the pragmatics of language understanding (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95). Then in B' functions as an interpretive particle which conveys the meaning that the content of the sentence it is appended to follows by way of inference from something the addressee just said. The response by B in (16)B" means essentially, "Given A's assertion that I have a dental appointment at noon, then I can take it as confirmed that I have a dental appointment at noon." The only way B's utterance can yield contextual effects for A is if A's utterance confirmed the truth of a proposition that B had been questioning, and B knows that A is aware of this. Thus, the fact that B had a dental appointment at noon was not activated for the first time by A; rather, A's utterance brought into focus a fact that was already mutually manifest to both A and B beforehand, thereby licensing the use of // in B". Salience can also be boosted non-linguistically. For example, the exchange in (17) 
The referential behavior of different types of dausally introduced referents
Another factor which seems to have an effect on whether or not a clausally introduced entity is brought into focus is the degree of world immanence of the entity and, correlatively, its manner and degree of individuation. Asher (1993) suggests that there is a spectrum of world immanence. Events and states, which have causal, spatial and temporal properties, have high world immanence; "purely abstract objects" such as propositions and thoughts have very low world immanence, and their individuation principles depend more on the means we use to describe them than on independent properties of objects in the world. Facts and situations are somewhere in between. Interestingly, this distinction appears to correlate with the accessibility to reference with // versus this or that when the entities in question are introduced by clausal constituents. Events, whose individuation properties are largely independent of the means we use to describe them, have referential properties similar to those of concrete objects and other referents denoted by nominal constituents of clauses, as seen in (20), where either // or a demonstrative thisjthat can refer to the event described in the first clause. Such facts are explained if we assume that the individuating properties that events share with referents of nominal constituents make it more likely that they will be brought into focus immediately subsequent to their introduction with a full clause. The addressee, in processing the first sentence in (20), posits a relation 'break' between John and a vase, and this relation involves an event of John breaking the vase. In the terms of Discourse Representation Theory, with an underlying event semantics for active verbs, the introduction of break'(w, v, e), into a DRS, for discourse entities u, v satisfying John(w) and vase(v), requires a discourse entity e for the event in which John broke the vase. Situations are somewhat less accessible to reference with it, as seen in (21). (21) a. John broke a priceless vase. That/this was intolerable to the embassy, b. John broke a priceless vase. ??It was intolerable to the embassy.
The predicate intolerable in (21) precludes an interpretation on which the demonstrative pronoun refers to the event of John breaking the vase, since an event is unchangeable once it has occurred, and thus cannot fail to be tolerated. The situation of John breaking the vase, in contrast, includes its ramifications, and those at least, are subject to amelioration or change, making it sensible to say that the situation is intolerable to the embassy, which will therefore require a change in the situation (realized as a change in the consequences or ramifications) without any change in the associated event in which the vase was broken. The inclusion, or potential inclusion, of ramifications as part of a situation, but not as part of an event, is plausibly what makes a situation not clearly delimited in spatiotemporal extent, and therefore less fully or clearly individuated upon introduction than an event.
Thus, situations, which are less world immanent than events, and less susceptible to individuation by spatiotemporal extent, are also less likely to
Since that merely requires activation of its referent, and anything in focus is also activated, in focus entities can be referenced with either that or it. be brought into focus upon first introduction with a full clause. The examples in (1) and (5) bear this out. Example (3) shows that facts pattern with situations, and not with events, in their availability for subsequent pronominal reference. Finally, as examples (4) and (6) show, clausally introduced propositions, which lie at the low end of the world immanence spectrum, are typically not available for subsequent pronominal reference with it. The proposition expressed by an utterance is activated by that utterance but is typically not brought into focus.
In order for an utterance to bring some entity into focus it is necessary, (though not sufficient) that the entity be directly expressed as part of the propositional content of the utterance. This explains, at least partly, the contrast between events on the one hand, and situations, facts and propositions on the other. Speech acts (i.e. acts performed by an utterance, which are not part of the propositional content) are thus never brought into focus, and are consequently inaccessible to subsequent reference with it. This is illustrated in (22) In (22), the demonstrative that is interpreted as referring to Eric's statement, "We're going to do more than just fire her". This interpretation is impossible if that is replaced with it, and the resulting sentence is thus unacceptable in this context. In (23), the demonstrative pronoun that in (B) is ambiguous between an interpretation where it refers to the act of John snoring and an interpretation where it refers to A's illocutionary act of informing B of this fact. In contrast, (23B') can only have the former interpretation.
The role of information structure
The cognitive status, and therefore the accessibility to pronominal reference, of a clausally introduced entity is partly constrained by the information structure of the utterance in which it is introduced into a discourse. 7 In particular, information structure yields some striking effects, but also a surprising asymmetry, when higher order entities are introduced by (or within) clausal complements.
Entities introduced by clausal complements to bridge verbs, such as think, believe, and say, exhibit the familiar pattern of being rendered activated, but not in-focus, through mention by a clause. This is shown by the naturally occurring example in (24) B: That's false; the file has been submitted to the district judge. B': # It's false; the file has been submitted to the district judge.
When (25A) is used with the focus-structure shown, to introduce the proposition that the company destroyed the file, the response by B using that is much more felicitous than the response with //. However, it and that are equally good when the complement clause is in the ground (theme; topic) of A's utterance, as in (26A).
(26) A: Alex [ F INSISTS/BELIEVES] that the company destroyed the file. B: But that's/it's false; the file has been submitted to the district judge.
By information structure, we mean a bifurcation of material in an utterance into what has been called focus versus ground, comment versus topic, or rheme versus theme. This notion is not to be identified with contrastive focus or with the more general distinction between new versus old information. Information structural focus is also distinct from the cognitive status 'in focus'. See Vallduvi (1990) and Gundel (1999a) for more detailed discussion of related terminological and conceptual issues. We will indicate information structural focus by the subscript 4 F\ Nuclear stress will be indicated by all capitals. The use of it in (24) would be just as infelicitous if the PP were not preposed. Thus, the infelicity of it in (24) cannot be attributed to its incompatibility with the secondary focal stress it bears in this position.
Since an entity associated with the ground (theme; topic) is already at least familiar to the addressee prior to the utterance (see Gundel 1988 inter alia), its mention within the utterance suffices to bring it into the focus of attention, if it does not already have that status.
In (24)- (26), relational givenness/newness and referential givenness/ newness (in the sense of Gundel 1988 Gundel , 1999a are coextensive. For example, the information structural focus in (25) represents a proposition that is not only new in relation to the topic (what Alex believes), but also referentially new to the hearer; and the clausal complement in the ground of (26) expresses a proposition which is not only given in relation to the informational structural focus, but also referentially given in the sense of being already at least familiar and probably also activated. But material in the informational focus doesn't have to be referentially new (see Gundel 1980 , 1999a , b, Vallduvi 1990 , Lambrecht 1994 . So when we have a bridge verb complement which is an information structural focus, but is already activated in the discourse, which factor wins out? Is an entity expressed by such a complement rendered in focus or does it remain merely activated? Is it accessible to reference with it, or only with that! Consider (27B2).
(27) Al: I believe that the company destroyed the file, but not everybody does. Bl: What does Alex believe? A2: Alex believes [ F that the company destroyed the file]. B2: But it's/that's false; the file has been submitted to the district judge.
(27B2) suggests that it is referential givenness (i.e. cognitive status of a discourse entity), and not relational givenness (i.e. topic-focus structure), that determines whether the complement of a bridge verb will be brought into focus. But now flip the problem around. Content in the topic/ground of an utterance does not always have a high degree of referential givenness. It's cognitive status may be merely familiar, but not necessarily activated. So when we have a bridge verb complement which is ground material, but new to the discourse, which factor wins out? Is an entity introduced by such a complement rendered in-focus, because it is in the ground, or merely activated, because it is new to the discourse? Is it accessible to reference with //, or only with that! Consider (28) Use of it is as felicitous as that in (28c). The information structure of (28b) forces the addressee to accept the content of the complement clause as already familiar, so that (28b) renders it in focus, making it available to reference using //. Thus, presentation of a clausally introduced entity in the ground of an utterance is another way to promote salience, and bring the entity into focus, even if it is, in fact, new to the discourse. With bridge verb complements, we thus appear to have an asymmetric situation: bifurcation into focus/ground has no effect on the cognitive status of an entity introduced within the information structural focus.
9 But it can have an effect when an entity is mentioned (even introduced) within ground material, because mention within the ground necessarily signals a higher cognitive status for the entity. This conclusion is preliminary, however, in that the judgments are subtle, and naturally occurring data that would bear directly on the issue is sparse.
5.
Lexical structure versus information structure
When the bridge verb in (25)- (28) is replaced with a factive verb, demonstrative and personal pronouns can both be used to immediately refer to the entity expressed by the complement clause, regardless of the information structure of A's utterance. (Constructed data surveyed on a sample of English speakers.) (29) A: Alex verified that the company destroyed the file.
B: That's false; the file has been submitted to the district judge. B': It's false; the file has been submitted to the district judge.
Thus, the contrast in (25) between subsequent reference with it versus that is not exhibited in (29), and the contrast between (25) and (26), exhibiting a partial effect of information structure on cognitive status, is also absent. The lexical semantics of the factive verb enforces the condition that the entity expressed by the complement clause be already familiar (or at least capable Gundel (1999a) makes a similar observation, concluding that mention within the information structural focus (her 'semantic focus') doesn't necessarily bring an entity into focus of attention.
of being accommodated as familiar) to the addressee, so that its further mention in A's utterance renders this entity in focus. In order to understand this fully, it is useful to note that this pattern is not confined to complements of factive verbs. It is also obtained in complements to certain non-factive (and non-bridge) verbs, including agree, emphasize, deny, and doubt, and in complements to the non-factive adjectival predicate be certain.
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(30) a. Alex and Susan agree that the company destroyed the file.
I'm surprised that they believe it. b. Alex and Susan agree that the company destroyed the file.
I'm surprised that they believe that. (31) A: Alex is certain that the company destroyed the file.
B: That's false: the file has been submitted to the district judge. B': It's false: the file has been submitted to the district judge.
As with factive predicates, the pattern in (30)- (31) is one in which it is at least as felicitous as that in referring to the content of the complement clause, and, in some cases, more so. The predicates in (30)- (31) are not factive (in the sense made clear by Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1971) since they don't commit the speaker of the ascription in which they occur to the truth of their complement clauses. However, they share with factives a slightly more subtle semantic property: they are felicitous when the proposition, fact, or situation expressed by the complement clause is not an entirely new entity, but rather, an entity already accepted as given or familiar in the discourse. The ascriptions with agree and certain in (30)- (31), as well as the factive ascription in (29), would be odd if used to introduce into the discourse the fact or proposition that the company destroyed the file. Using a situation variable in the semantics, in the context of Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp and Reyle 1993) , the interpretation of the factive ascription in (29) can be expressed by the Discourse Representation Structure (DRS) shown in (32) below.
11 The ascriptions with Cattell (1978) noticed that these non-factives pattern with factives in wh-extraction from their complements. See also Melvold (1991), Hegarty (1992) , and Schulz (1999) for discussion of this class of predicates. Subordinate DRSs are abbreviated as formulas here to save space. For semantic representations using a situation variable, see Ginzburg (1995a, b) , and, for similar structures with an event variable, Higginbotham (1985 Higginbotham ( , 1989 . Schultz (1999) presents a proposal very similar in spirit to that represented in (32), but implemented quite differently in the context of Heim's (1982) File Card Semantics.
agree and certain in (30)- (31), though non-factive, would have identical DRS's, with trivial substitution of the verb denotations.
In contrast, a belief ascription such as that in (25A), using a bridge verb, is interpreted semantically as just a relation between Alex and the proposition expressed by the complement clause. A DRS for (25A) is presented in (33).
(33)
Of course, the ascription made by A in (25) could express a proposition which is already familiar to the hearer. The property distinguishing bridge verbs from the factive and other predicates discussed here is not that the content of the bridge verb complement must be unfamiliar, but only that it can be. Bridge verbs, unlike other predicates discussed here, do not assume the familiarity of the content of the complement. Interrogatives pattern with factive complements with regard to the status of abstract entities mentioned by or within them. Naturally occurring data are shown in (34) and (35).
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(34) One common attribute of a scientist is an unusually acute sense of numbers and their implications. I think it was Bertrand Russell who once observed that mankind would rather commit suicide than learn arithmetic. In other words, the meaning and implications of some numbers are often lost on most people -even when those numbers bring a very important message. George Bernard Shaw stated that Also, note that the first paragraph of (35) could felicitously be followed by It is a mystery, with // interpreted as specified at the end of the example.
one distinguishing characteristic of an educated person is that he or she can be emotionally moved by statistics. A sense of numbers -why do I dwell on this observation? Perhaps it's because we who come from a background of engineering, mathematics and science tend to convey concepts and findings in terms of numbers; yet many for whom our messages are intended find our communications (full of numbers as they are) unappetizing, boring, unconvincing and a bit standoffish. (American Scientist 88: 378) (35) Where and for how long saguaro, cardon, and organ pipe lived together before moving into the Sonoran Desert is currently unknown. Thus, we do not know where these species evolved the phenological differences that reduce their joint reliance for pollination on a single species of nectar-feeding bat.
One hint about this, however, comes from geographic variation in the timing of peak flowering in organ pipe. American Scientist [This can be felicitously replaced with it here, without affecting interpretation:]
One hint about it, however, comes from geographic variation in the timing of peak flowering in organ pipe. [// = where these species evolved the differences that reduce their joint reliance for pollination on a single species of nectar-feeding bat.] Constructed data has been tested on a small survey of English speakers, with the results shown in (36)-(37). The possibility of immediate subsequent reference with a personal pronoun in (36)-(37) follows from the presuppositional nature of questions. To simplify, within DRT, the wonder-ascnpuon in (36A) should be represented with a DRS of the form shown in (38), where φ is an appropriate relation between Alex and the proposition p specified on the penultimate line of theDRS.
Interpreted as in (38), the wonder-ascription in (36A) is a statement about Alex, the company, the file, and the proposition that the company destroyed the file. This should be the form of any semantic account of the wonderascription which captures the presuppositionality of the embedded question: the proposition that the company destroyed the file must be an established discourse entity prior to the utterance of (36A), or it must be accommodated in the sense of Heim (1982) . The assertive content of (36A) should be captured in the last line of the DRS, φ. On one realization of φ, given in Hegarty (2001) , (36A) asserts that Alex is in the state of wonder with respect to the proposition that ρ holds of the actual world, w 0 . The embedded interrogative in (37) is also presuppositional: it pertains to the property that holds (across worlds) of those who destroyed the file, and asserts of it that Alex is in the relation of wonder to this property instantiated on the actual world. This is a minimal condition which holds of any occasion on which the wonder-ascription in (37) is used felicitously. In actual fact, on a given occasion of use, stronger conditions might hold. For example, the speaker might know the person who destroyed the file, or have a set of suspects in mind. But this doesn't have to be the case. The wonder-ascription in (37) could be used even if the speaker doesn't believe that anyone destroyed the file, as would be the case, for example, if the speaker knew that the file was carried off by the wind. The semantic content of the wonder-ascription, common to any use of it, is that Alex is in some sort of To unsimplify, questions are, in fact, constrained not only by the formal semantic condition captured here, but by rich contextual conditions on what would count as a suitable answer to a question in a given context. See Ginzburg (1995a, b) and Asher and Lascarides (1998) . The important point, for present purposes, is that these accounts would incorporate, and add to, the presuppositional condition given here. The proposals sketched here would therefore be a part of an account given according to these richer theories of the interpretation of questions.
relationship to the property that holds of one just in case one destroyed the file. Who, if anyone, truly instantiates this property in the actual world is not part of the semantic meaning of the ascription. Thus, the property of being one who destroyed the file must be either established prior to the utterance of (37), or accommodated on the occasion of utterance. A DRS expressing the semantic interpretation of the wonder-ascription in (37) should therefore have the form shown in (39). 14 (39) w, z, P Alex (κ) File (z)
(x, z,
A simple representation of the assertion of the wonder-ascription in (37) is φ = wonder (a, P(w 0 )).
Returning to (38), the content of p, specified in the penultimate line of the DRS in (38), is thus mentioned again within the condition φ. The penultimate line in (38) thus enforces double processing of the proposition that the company destroyed the file, rendering it in-focus at completion of the wonder-ascription in (36A). The penultimate line in (39) does the same for the property "destroy the file" at completion of the wonder-ascription in (37). Thus the penultimate line expressing the presuppositionality of questions in (38) and (39) is analogous to the effect of the penultimate line of the DRS for factive (and similar) ascriptions, in (32) above.
The presuppositionality involved in the lexical structure of a factive (or related) predicate, and the semantic presuppositionality of embedded questions, are thus additional factors which can bring an entity into focus. In these cases, information structure has no bearing on the cognitive status of the clausally introduced entity.
Either of the wonder-ascriptions in (36A) and (37) could pertain to a particular, discourse represented, situation in which the file was destroyed. This is somewhat more likely to be the case in use of (37) than (36A). The discourse status of such a situation could be captured in either (38) or (39) by placing the situation variable s in the list of old discourse entities, and by removing the existential quantification over s within the representations of the proposition p in (38) and the property P in (39) 6. Conclusion
In this paper, we addressed the fact that clausally introduced entities, immediately subsequent to their introduction into a discourse, are typically accessible to reference with a demonstrative pronoun, but not with the personal pronoun //. We found that this fact can be explained on the basis of the observation that such entities are typically activated, but not brought into focus, upon their introduction to a discourse. However, clausally introduced entities are, in fact, sometimes referenced with // immediately subsequent to their introduction. An examination of the discourse environments in which this is possible provides important insights into the various syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic factors that can boost the salience of an entity and bring it into focus.
We've shown that information structure, in the sense of a focus/ground bifurcation, is one such factor when an entity is mentioned with a bridge verb complement, but only in a way which is asymmetric, depending on whether the entity is mentioned within focal or non-focal material. When the complement is focal, there is no effect: the cognitive status of an entity expressed by a focal complement depends entirely on the referential givenness/newness (i.e. the cognitive status) of the entity. But when the complement is part of the ground (topic/theme), the entity is brought into focus.
In factive complements and embedded questions, the lexical nature of the embedding predicate and the semantic nature of the construction require an entity mentioned with the subordinate clause to be treated as referentially given independently of the information-structure of the utterance.
